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ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEIZING
AIRCRAFT WITHOUT A HEARING PURSUANT
TO SECTION 903(b) OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ACT OF 1958: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UP
IN THE AIR
EDWARD BURKE ARNOLDS*
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT of 1958 1 (Act) and the
Federal Aviation Regulations2 (FARs) promulgated pursu-
ant thereto provide the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (Administrator) with various methods of en-
forcing the Act and the FARs. Methods of enforcement in-
clude the following: administrative actions, which may result
in warning notices or letters of correction;4 certificate actions,
which may result in suspension or revocation of certificates
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); 5 and
civil penalties, which may result in fines of up to $1,000 for
each violation.' In cases in which the Administrator elects to
pursue civil penalties, he is authorized immediately to com-
Associate Professor, John Marshall Law School (Chicago); B.A., S.T.B., M.A., St.
Mary of the Lake (Mundelein), J.D., Northwestern University School of Law.
49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
14 C.F.R. §§ 13.1-13.131 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 13.11(b)(1) (1982). A "warning notice" "recites available facts and
information about the incident or condition and indicates that a violation may have
occurred." Id.
4 14 C.F.R. § 13.11 (b)(2) (1982). A "letter of correction" "confirms a decision by
the FAA in the matter of the administrative action and states the necessary correc-
tive action the alleged violator has taken or agrees to take." Id. "If the agreed correc-
tive action is not fully completed, legal enforcement action may be taken." Id.
8 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 13.19 (1982).
6 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 14 C.F.R. § 13.15 (1982).
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promise and to settle for a lesser amount.7 Unless the fine is
paid "voluntarily," however, the Administrator is required to
instigate proceedings in a United States district court in order
to collect the fine.8 Not surprisingly, few such cases go to trial
because the cost of a trial would almost always exceed the
maximum fine.9 Although the maximum fine is relatively
small, cases are usually settled for less. 10
Notwithstanding the small amount of the fine, section
903(b) of the Act1" and section 13.17 of the FARs 2 still pro-
vide the FAA with an extraordinary provisional remedy: a re-
gional director or the chief counsel may authorize summary
seizure of an aircraft that is involved in a violation of the Act
or a FAR for which a civil penalty may be imposed on its
owner or operator." No pre-seizure notice, much less the op-
49 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); 14 C.F.R. § 13.15(b) (1982) (authorizing
the Administrator to compromise any contemplated civil penalty).
* 14 C.F.R. § 13.15(e) (1982). Either party to the suit may demand a jury trial. 49
U.S.C. § 1473(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
' Letter from Mr. Richard C. Hall, Chief of the National Safety Data Branch of the
FAA's Flight Standards National Field Office, to Professor Arnolds (Jan. 25, 1982),
(stating that for the period from July 1, 1980 through June 30, 1981, 394 civil penal-
ties were imposed in which three were referred to a United States attorney for collec-
tion, and none of the cases actually went to trial).
'o See supra note 7.
49 U.S.C. § 1473(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
14 C.F.R. § 13.17 (1982).
, Relevant portions of the Act are discussed below. According to 49 U.S.C. §
1471(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980):"[a]ny person who violates. . . any provision. . . of this
chapter . . . or any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder. . . shall be subject
to a civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each such violation ...."
In case an aircraft is involved in such violation and the violation is by the owner or
person in command of the aircraft, such aircraft shall be subject to lien for the pen-
alty. According to 49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(2) (1976): "[a]ny aircraft subject to such lien
may be summarily seized by and placed in the custody of such persons as the Board
or Administrator may by regulation prescribe ... "
Section 1473(b)(3) provides:
The aircraft shall be released from such custody upon payment of the
penalty or the amount agreed upon in compromise; or seizure in pur-
suance of process of any court in proceedings in rem for enforcement
of the lien, or notification by the United States attorney of failure to
institute such proceedings; or deposit of a bond in such amount and
with such sureties as the Board or Administrator may prescribe, condi-
tioned upon the payment of the penalty or the amount agreed upon in
compromise.
49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(3) (1976). The regulations track and implement these statutory
provisions but do not make any substantive changes. 14 C.F.R. § 13.17(a) (1982). Sec-
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portunity for a pre-seizure hearing is required.' 4 Moreover, no
tion 13.17(a) provides:
Under section 903 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.
1473)!osic], a State or Federal law enforcement officer, or a Federal
Aviation Administration safety inspector, authorized in an order of
seizure issued by the Regional Director of the region, or by the Chief
Counsel may summarily seize an aircraft that is involved in a violation
for which a civil penalty may be imposed on its owner or operator.
The FAA's own policies, however, may be slightly different. FAA Order 2150.3, par-
agraph 1205(a) (May 16, 1980), chapter 12, page 176, of a manual titled "Compliance
and Enforcement Program," states as follows:
Seizure to collect civil penalty. An aircraft involved in a violation may
be seized in accordance with Section 903(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 and Section 13.17 of the F.A.R. when the violation is by
the owner or person in command and such violator is known to have
insufficient assets, other than the aircraft concerned, to compromise
the civil penalty or to satisfy a judgment assessing the civil penalty
.... Such a seizure can be made when such violator is believed to
intend to remove the aircraft from the jurisdiction of the court which
would assess or has assessed the civil penalty, or the aircraft was in-
volved in a serious violation of the Act or regulations subjecting it to
such civil penalties and the actions of the violator (owner or person in
command) indicate the probability of future serious violations.
FAA Order 2150.3, paragraph 1205(a) (May 16, 1980) (emphasis added). It is unclear
to what extent such orders bind an agency. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (d) (1976) (distin-
guishing between "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of organi-
zation, procedure or practice" from "substantive" rules). Compare Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) with Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 233, 235 (1974) (Where the
rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own
procedures even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than other-
wise would be required) and United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 757-58 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind Regula-
tors, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 137 (1967); Note, 87 HARv. L. REV. 629 (1974).
Strictly read, paragraph 1205(a) appears to allow seizure only when: (1) the violator
is the owner or person in command of the aircraft; and (2) the violator is known to
lack sufficient assets, other than the aircraft, with which to pay the penalty; and (3)
either (a) the violator is believed to intend the removal of the aircraft from the juris-
diction (presumably the United States), or (b) the aircraft was involved in a serious
violation and the violator indicates the probability of future serious violations. Unless
the FAA is bound by its internal regulation, the existence of the regulation, which is
neither published nor readily available, would not seem to prevent a facial attack on
the constitutional validity of the statute or FAR.
14 F.A.A. Order 2150.3, paragraph 1205(b). Subsection (b) states:
(b)Issuance of civil penalty letter. An aircraft may be seized after a
civil penalty letter is issued or when the issuance of such letter is con-
templated. In the latter case, if immediate action is essential, it is not
absolutely necessary that a civil penalty letter be issued since the writ-
ten notice of seizure to the registered owner of the aircraft serves to
advise the owner of the violations committed and the liabilities in-
curred. If the aircraft is seized after a district court assesses a civil
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post-seizure hearing prior to trial is provided. Section 903(b)
of the Act and section 13.17 of the FARs merely provide for
release of the aircraft when (i) the penalty or a compromise
amount plus the costs of seizing, storing, and maintaining the
aircraft are paid, (ii) the United States District Attorney re-
fuses to institute proceedings against the owner or operator of
the aircraft, or (iii) a bond is posted in the amount prescribed
by the FAA."8 A rough equivalent of section 903(b) would be
an ordinance permitting police officers summarily to seize
automobiles whenever officers contemplate issuing traffic
tickets.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the procedural due
process" problems presented by section 903(b) of the Act.
First, this paper will examine the cases decided under this
statute. Second, the constitutionality of section 903(b) will be
discussed in light of relevant United States Supreme Court
(Supreme Court) decisions.
I. CASES ARISING UNDER SECTION 903(b)
Only two cases have dealt directly with the issue of the con-
stitutionality of seizing aircraft pursuant to section 903(b),
Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield 7 and United States v. Vertol
penalty, a civil penalty letter need not be issued.
Id. (emphasis added). No requirement existed in the statute or the regulation that
pre-seizure notice be given in cases where immediate action is not essential.
49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(3) (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 13.17(e) (1982).
' The Constitution prohibits the federal government and state governments from
depriving a person of his property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V,
§ XIV, § 1. These due process clauses guarantee a property owner the right to an
evidentiary hearing before the government terminates his property right. See Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). In addition the hearing must be afforded within a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). In cer-
tain circumstances, however, the government may deprive a person of his property
prior to the full and final adjudication of a pending controversy. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1970). Such a deprivation must still comport with due process.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). See infra notes 126-31 and accom-
panying text. A person who owns seized property, the possession of which is not per
se unlawful, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of its seizure. One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 701 n.11 (1965).
11 369 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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H21C.18 These cases reached different results. Both cases,
however, turned on their own facts rather than on the legal
issue of the constitutionality of section 903(b).
In Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield,"e a federal district court de-
cided in favor of the FAA, upholding the Act and the FARs
against a challenge that the Act and the FARs worked a dep-
rivation of property without due process of law. In Aircrane,
the FAA seized a Sikorsky H-37 (H-37) rebuilt military sur-
plus helicopter owned by Aircrane. This seizure resulted in
two suits. In the first suit, Aircrane sued the Administrator
seeking declaratory judgments that the Act and the FARs
were unconstitutional insofar as they prohibited use of the H-
37 to haul any external loads for "compensation or hire,"20
and insofar as they authorized seizure of the H-37 for viola-
tions of regulations without prior notice or a hearing.2 In the
second suit, the government sought, inter alia, to collect civil
penalties from Aircrane for violatiohs of FARs that prohibited
an aircraft certificated in the "restricted" category 22 from car-
rying persons or property for "compensation or hire. '23
The two suits were heard together 24 and the court held for
the FAA in both. On the seizure question, the court formu-
lated the following issue: "[D]oes the 'compensation or hire'
regulation further a governmental interest of sufficient magni-
tude that violation of the regulation justifies dispensing with
the usual procedural protections, permitting summary
seizure? ' 25 Applying a balancing test, the court decided in
favor of the government. The court stated that the depriva-
tion of the aircraft was minimal because Aircrane could re-
cover the use of its helicopter simply by posting a $1,000
,8 545 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1976).
369 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
20 Aircrane contended that it was unconstitutional to arbitrarily deny to one cate-
gory of aircraft the right to carry external loads for hire while granting the same right
to others. Id. at 610.
" Id. at 600.
22 A "restricted" category aircraft is one which is limited to "special purpose opera-
tions." 14 C.F.R. § 21.25 (1982).
:3 Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. at 600.
24 Id. at 607, 613.
28 Id. at 605.
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bond.2 Moreover, Aircrane had an opportunity to present
complete information to the FAA before seizure and to con-
test the claim for penalty after seizure.2 7 In the court's opin-
ion, Aircrane's interest did not outweigh the substantial pub-
lic-safety-related governmental interest which was the basis
for the restrictions imposed on "restricted" category aircraft.2 8
The court, however, did not explain how the seizure ad-
vanced a legitimate governmental interest in air safety when
Aircrane was able to regain use of the H-37 by posting the
bond. The decision seems to imply that if the public safety
factor had not been present, if the posting of the bond had
imposed a greater burden, and if the FAA had not been com-
municating with Aircrane prior to the seizure, the court would
have declared the seizure unconstitutional.2 9
In United States v. Vertol H21C30 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held the seizure of an aircraft unconstitu-
tional.8 1 Vertol also involved a helicopter allegedly being used
for "compensation or hire" in external load operations while
the aircraft was licensed in the "restricted" category. Having
unilaterally determined that the owner of the helicopter had
violated certain FARs32 the FAA sought $6,000 in civil penal-
ties from the owner and seized the helicopter." Approxi-
mately one month later, the FAA initiated suit in federal
court to collect the $6,000.34 More than a year and a half later,
the FAA released the helicopter in exchange for a $6,000
bond.35 Shortly thereafter, the district court granted the own-
er's motion to release the bond, holding that the seizure of the
helicopter violated the owner's due process. 6
" Id. at 608.
" Id. at 607.
8Id.
"Id. at 605, 607-09.
s0 545 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1976).
s Id. at 650.
82 14 C.F.R. § § 91.39, 133.11 (1972).
' United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d at 649.
Id.
" Id. at 650.
" Id. The district court's holding that the seizure of the helicopter violated the
owner's right to due process was based on the court's finding that the government
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The court of appeals affirmed.37 Also applying a balancing
test, the appellate court noted that the seizure "effectively
paralyzed" 38 the owner's business while the government's in-
terest in the matter was slight.39 Rejecting the claim that the
seizure was related to safety, the court emphasized that the
statutory scheme of section 903(b) permitted the aircraft to be
reclaimed and put back into operation upon deposit of a
bond.40 The court stated that other procedures were available
which permitted the FAA to take summary action when safety
was truly involved.4' The court found that the government's
interest in the instant case was merely to facilitate collection
of the $6,000, and held that this interest was insufficient to
support summary seizure.2
The appellate court refused to extend to the FAA the power
summarily to take property as security when the court was of
the opinion that the civil penalties eventually would be paid.43
The court stated that such a holding would be particularly in-
appropriate when no need existed for prompt action and
nothing indicated that the owner could not pay the penalty in
fact assessed.44 The court further noted that the government
did not contend that a requirement for a pre-seizure hearing
would unduly hamper FAA enforcement efforts. 5
Aircrane and Vertol, although reaching different results,
seem to agree in principle that the FAA cannot seize an air-
craft without prior notice and the opportunity for a pre-
seizure hearing absent extraordinary circumstances such as
protecting the public safety. The seizure of an aircraft to in-
virtually shut down the owner's business by seizing the helicopter. Id. at 651.
'7 Id. at 650.
I8 ld. at 651.
I d.
0 d.
" Id. Section 1429, upheld in Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1975) and
Air East, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1975), permits ex
parte revocations of airworthiness certificates in cases of emergency. 49 U.S.C. § 1429
(1976). Section 1485 authorizes ex parte orders by the Secretary of Transportation
when essential to air safety. 49 U.S.C. § 1485 (1976).
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sure the payment of a possible judgment is not a sufficient
governmental interest."" Other factors must be considered
such as did the FAA in fact afford the owner or the operator
an opportunity to be heard and what was the actual impact of
the seizure on the owner or the operator. Thus, in Aircrane
the court found that the posting of a $1,000 bond was a "mini-
mal" inconvenience when the owner had been afforded an op-
portunity to present his case to the FAA prior to the seizure,"
while in Vertol, the court said the summary seizure requiring
a $6,000 bond "effectively paralyzed"48 the owner and "drove
him to the wall."'4 9
By deciding the cases on their individual facts, the Aircrane
court and the Vertol court never faced the issue of whether
the Act or the FARs are facially constitutional as to summary
seizures of aircraft. Neither the Act nor the FARs provide for
pre-seizure notice, pre-seizure hearing, prompt post-seizure
hearing, or any balancing of interests.50 Unless the owner or
4" See also United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir.
1979). In Lockheed, the L-188 was seized and released when the owner posted a
$25,000 bond. When the government sued to collect civil penalties, the owner coun-
terclaimed for $10,000 damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976)
on the theory that the seizure without prior notice or opportunity for hearing consti-
tuted an unconstitutional forfeiture, being a taking of property without just compen-
sation in violation of the fifth amendment. Noting its decision in Vertol, the court
distinguished the cases on procedural grounds. The court stated that in Vertol, the
owners had raised the question of illegal seizure as a defense to the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, whereas in Lockheed the question was raised as a counterclaim. Acknowledg-
ing a split of authority on the question of whether one sued by the government can
counterclaim under the Tucker Act, the court declined to decide the issue, affirming
the district court's decision on the ground that dismissal of the counterclaim was
appropriate because the unconstitutionality of the seizure could have been raised as
an affirmative defense in the forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 396. The court said, how-
ever, that its decision did not foreclose the owner from bringing its Tucker Act claim
as an independent action in the district court or the Court of Claims. Id. at 397.
Perhaps Lockheed is better understood in light of the fact that a jury found 522
separate violations, subjecting the aircraft to $165,000 in fines, id. at 393, although
the government had stipulated that if it won a judgment in excess of $25,000 the
bond plus interest would be taken in full satisfaction of the judgment. Id. at 393 n.4.
The owner hoped to offset the judgment by $10,000. Id. at 395.
,7 Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield; 369 F. Supp. 598, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
:1 United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1976).
49 Id.
W See supra note 13. Compare United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648 (9th
Cir. 1976) (unilateral "determination by the FAA that the helicopter was involved in
violations of regulations") and United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d
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the operator pays the fine or posts a bond conditioned on the
amount of the penalty and storage costs, he must normally
await the outcome of the trial for collection of the fine before
reclaiming his aircraft."'
II. RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CASES
The Supreme Court has recently taken several different ap-
proaches in determining the constitutionality of pre-seizure
hearings when provisional remedies have involved the tempo-
rary deprivation of property. These cases have left the proce-
dural due process question somewhat confused.
The first relevant case decided by the Supreme Court was
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 52 In Sniadach, a finance
company brought a garnishment action in a Wisconsin state
court against the defendant, Sniadach, and her employer, as
garnishee, on a $420 promissory note.53 In its answer, the gar-
nishee stated that it owed $63.18 to the defendant in unpaid
wages and that, in accordance with a Wisconsin statute, the
garnishee would pay one-half to the defendant as a subsis-
tence allowance and hold the other one-half subject to an or-
der by the court.54
390, 394 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[The owner] contends that the seizure of its aircraft vio-
lated due process because the FAA neither notified it in advance of seizure nor held a
pre-seizure hearing. The statutes and regulations which authorized the seizure do not
require the FAA to give the notice of hearing that [the owner] argues is necessary.")
with Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. 598, 609 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("In this case,
the extended correspondence between [the owners and the FAA] . . . provided a sig-
nificant opportunity for Owners [sic] to argue their contentions before the Adminis-
trator. If this exchange were unique or ad hoc, it probably could not redeem a flawed
statutory scheme, but the informal submission of evidence and argument, both writ-
ten and oral, is mapped out by FAR § 13.15. . . ."). The correspondence in Aircrane
was initiated by the owner, however, Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 365 F. Supp. at 602,
and 14 C.F.R. § 13.15 (1982) appear to require the FAA to notify an alleged violator
(not necessarily the owner), and allow him to present evidence in connection with a
civil penalty letter, only if the Administrator wishes to compromise the penalty.
51 See 49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(3) (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 13.17(e) (1982). Moreover, no stat-
utory requirement exists mandating that the trial be prompt. See generally
Kandaras, Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee a Prompt
Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 195 (1981).
2 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Id. at 338.
Id. According to Wis. STAT. § 267.18(2)(a):
[w]hen wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the gar-
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Under the Wisconsin statute, the clerk of the court could
issue a garnishment summons at the request of the plaintiff's
lawyer. The plaintiff's lawyer could then freeze a defendant's
wages by serving the garnishee. The plaintiff's lawyer, then
was required to serve the defendant with a summons and a
complaint within ten days after service on the garnishee. If
the defendant prevailed on the merits at trial, the defendant's
wages would be restored. In the meantime, the defendant was
deprived of the wages. 5
In Sniadach, the defendant moved to dismiss the garnish-
ment proceeding for its failure to comply with the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 6 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court refused to dismiss the proceeding, holding
that no due process violation had occurred.57 On writ of cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 8 Noting
that wages are a specialized type of property presenting dis-
tinct problems in our economic system,' 9 the Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Douglas, held that the failure
to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
garnishment of the wages violated the defendant's due
process. 0
Three years after Sniadach, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 81 the Su-
preme Court made clear that the right to pre-attachment no-
tice and hearing extended to other kinds of property besides
nishee shall pay to the principal defendant on the date when such
wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence allowance out
of the wages or salary then owing, the sum of $25 in the case of an
individual without dependents or $40 in the case of an individual with
dependents; but in no event in excess of fifty percent of the wages or
salary owing.
395 U.S. at 338 n.1.




8, Id. at 340. The Supreme Court stated that prejudgment garnishment of wages as
opposed to garnishment of other types of property imposed a "tremendous hardship
on wage earners with families to support," id., and allows the creditor to exert "tre-
mendous leverage on the debtor, thereby forcing the debtor to pay a possibly fraudu-
lent claim plus collection charges." Id. at 341.
" Id. at 342.
6- 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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wages. Mrs. Fuentes had purchased a stove, a service policy,
and a stereo from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
(Firestone) under a conditional sales contract. The contract
provided for monthly payments by the buyer and repossession
by the seller in case the buyer defaulted on any payment.2 A
dispute arose concerning the servicing of the stove." Mrs.
Fuentes stopped making payments while still owing approxi-
mately $200 under the contract. 4 Firestone brought an action
for repossession and at the same time obtained a writ of re-
plevin. The writ of replevin ordered the sheriff to seize the
stove and the stereo pursuant to a Florida statute which pro-
vided for summary issuance of a writ of replevin on the ex
parte application to the clerk of the court by a person suing
on a claim of wrongfully detained property."
Under the statute, a plaintiff was required to post a bond
for double the value of the property prior to obtaining a writ
of replevin.6 After the writ of replevin was issued, the prop-
erty would be held for three days by the seizing agent, during
which time the defendant could regain possession by posting a
bond double the value of the property. 7 If the defendant did
not post a bond, the property would pass to the plaintiff
pending the final outcome of the trial."
The day the writ of attachment was issued the sheriff
served Mrs. Fuentes and seized the stove and the stereo. 9
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Fuentes sued in federal court and
challenged the replevin procedure on due process grounds. 0
Mrs. Fuentes lost in the district court, but the Supreme Court
reversed.7 1 The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart
and joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, held
that the challenged procedure violated due process because




" Id. at 74.
67 Id. at 73-75.
u Id. at 75.
Id. at 79.
70 Id.
,1 Id. at 97.
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the procedure failed to provide for notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to the deprivation of a possessory interest in
the property.72 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun, dissented on the ground that protec-
tion of the creditor's property justified the procedure.7 3 Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Powell did not participate in the case.74
The third case, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,75 was decided
two years after Fuentes. W. T. Grant Co. (Grant) sold various
items to Mitchell on an installment sales contract basis.76
When Mitchell defaulted in payments, Grant sued, alleging a
vendor's lien, and simultaneously obtained a writ of
77sequestration.
Under a Louisiana statute, sequestration was allowed if the
plaintiff claimed ownership, a right to possession, or a lien
and if the defendant had the power to dispose of or remove
the property.7 8 The sequestration statute did not provide for
notice or a hearing prior to seizure.7 The statute did require
the plaintiff to state specific facts by way of affidavit support-
ing issuance of the writ and to file a bond sufficient to protect
the defendant against any damage arising from wrongful issu-
ance. S0 Although issuance of the writ was accomplished by a
plaintiff's ex parte application to a judge, the defendant could
immediately seek dissolution, which the court would grant,
unless the plaintiff could prove the ground upon which the
71 Id. at 96. The Supreme Court also invalidated a Pennsylvania law which was
similar.
"' See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 99-102 (White, J., dissenting).
7, Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97.
78 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
71 Id. at 601.
77 Id. at 602.
78 The Louisiana statute extant at the time of the decision in W. T. Grant
provided:
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a
mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized
under a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant
to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenue therefrom,
or remove the property from the parish, during the pendancy of the
action.
LA. CODE CIv. Paoc. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
7, 416 U.S. at 605-07.
80 Id.
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writ was issued. 1 The defendant also could regain possession
by posting his own bond.2
After Mitchell was served with the writ of sequestration,
and his disputed goods were seized, he moved to dissolve the
writ for failure of procedural due process.8 The state courts
denied the motion and upheld the procedure.8 4 A writ of cer-
tiorari was obtained from the Supreme Court. Justice White,
joined by the two dissenters in Fuentes plus Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, 85 wrote the majority opinion which affirmed
the decisions of the state courts.8" The Supreme Court stated
that Mitchell was distinguishable from Fuentes87 in that in
Fuentes a clerk had ordered the writ of replevin,88 whereas in
Mitchell the judge had ordered the writ of sequestration.8
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Mitchell emphasized that
the Louisiana law (i) required a detailed affidavit showing a
plaintiff's right to possession, (ii) provided the opportunity for
an immediate post-seizure hearing, (iii) provided for damages
for wrongful sequestration, and (iv) in general, involved more
judicial supervision." The dissenters in Mitchell, Justices
Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall, argued that the majority in
Mitchell had merely adopted the dissent in Fuentes.91
The last case in the series, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
DiChem, Inc.,92 involved the garnishment of a bank account
and was therefor unlike the previously discussed cases in that
the plaintiff did not claim a pre-existing right in the seized
property. More importantly, the writ was issued pursuant to a
Georgia statute by the clerk of the court on an affidavit which
I /d.
s' Id. at 607.
8' Id. at 602.
8 Id. at 603.
85 Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the Fuentes decision. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
"6 416 U.S. at 603.
87 Id. at 615.
88 Id.
09 Id. at 616.
Id. at 615-18.
Id. at 634. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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merely stated that the plaintiff had "reason to apprehend the
loss of said sum or some part thereof unless process of Gar-
nishment [sic] issues." 3 No other details were offered and the
Georgia statute did not provide for an immediate post-seizure
hearing.9"
The Georgia courts upheld the garnishment procedure
against the claim that it violated the due process clause. 95 On
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.96 Justice
White, writing for the majority, distinguished Mitchell on the
grounds that the Louisiana sequestration statute required a
pre-seizure judicial determination based on a detailed affida-
vit and entitled the debtor to an immediate post-seizure hear-
ing whereas the Georgia garnishment statute had none of the
"saving characteristics. 9 7 Likening the case to Fuentes, Jus-
tice White stated that the seizure without prior notice vio-
lated due process. 8
A coherent rule regarding the procedural due process re-
quirements for a prejudgment seizure is difficult to discern
from Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and Di-Chem. The major-
ity in Di-Chem claimed to rely on Fuentes, and Justice
Stewart, concurring in Di-Chem, thought Fuentes had been
resuscitated. 9 One might wonder, however, whether the Geor-
gia statute would have been upheld if the statute had pro-
vided for an immediate post-seizure hearing. 100 Based on the
previously discussed Supreme Court decisions, it is unclear
whether Mitchell is the standard (due process requirements
are met without a pre-seizure hearing so long as a judge issues
the writ and a post-seizure hearing is available) or whether
Mitchell is the exception to the Fuentes standard (due pro-
"3 Id. at 604.
4 Id. at 607.
95 Id. at 605.
"Id.
9 Id. at 607.
" Id. at 605-08.
" Id. at 608.
Soo See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 609-14 (Powell,
J., concurring)(procedural due process would be satisfied when adequate, pre-seizure
security measures are established before a neutral officer and a prompt post-garnish-
ment judicial hearing is given).
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cess generally requires notice and an opportunity for a pre-
seizure hearing).
Regardless of which case states the general rule, section
903(b) of the Federal Aviation Act and Section 13.17 of the
FARs clearly do not meet the standard of either Mitchell or
Fuentes.10 1 The government is required to post no bond. No
judicial procedure is involved prior to seizure. Furthermore,
neither the statute nor the regulations provide for any type of
post-seizure hearing before the trial on the underlying cause
of action.10
The Supreme Court in Fuentes, however, noted that in a
few "extraordinary,"' 103 "truly unusual," 104 "limited'10 5 situa-
tions, outright seizure without an opportunity for a prior
hearing was constitutionally permissible. 06 The Supreme
Court in prior cases allowed summary seizure of property to
protect the public from contaminated food,0 from a bank
failure, 08 and from misbranded drugs. 09 The Supreme Court
also provided for summary proceedings to aid in the collection
of taxes,1 0 to aid the war effort,"' and to secure jurisdiction
in state court."12 The Supreme Court in Fuentes characterized
these situations as follows:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate forces: the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under stan-
201 Cf. United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Thus, in
all important respects, the seizure in this case lacks the protections which the Su-
preme Court emphasized in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant ....")
102 See supra note 13 for relevant portions of the Act and FARs.
1o Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 90-91.
107 North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
1o8 Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
,o, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
10 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
"I United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
112 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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dards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and
justified in the particular instance. s
In a post-Fuentes case the Supreme Court extended the list
of "extraordinary situations"'1 4 to include a Puerto Rican for-
feiture statute. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.," the Puerto Rican authorities found marijuana on a
yacht which had been leased to Puerto Rican residents."' The
Puerto Rican statute provided for the forfeiture of vessels
used for unlawful purposes without prior notice or an oppor-
tunity to be heard.17 As a result, the authorities seized the
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
Id. at 90.
III 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
I' ld. at 665.
1 Id. at 665-67. The following Puerto Rico Statutues are relevant to the case. Ac-
cording to P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25 §§ 2512(a) (4), 2512(b)
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or ves-
sels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in
any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, posses-
sion, or concealment of property described in clauses (1) and (2)
of this subsection;
(b) Any property subject to forfeiture under clause (4) of subsection
(a) of this section shall be seized by process issued pursuant to Act No.
39, of June 4, 1960, as amended, known as the Uniform Vehicle,
Mount, Vessel and Plane Seizure Act, sections 1721 and 1722 of Title
34.
According to P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34 § 1722:
Whenever any vehicle, mount, or other vessel or plane is seized ...
such seizure shall be conducted as follows: (a) The proceedings shall be
begun by the seizure of the property by the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of the Treasury or the Police Superintendent, through their
delegates, policemen or other peace officers. The officer under whose
authority the action is taken shall serve notice on the owner of the
property seized or the person in charge thereof or any person having
any known right or interest therein, of the seizure and of the appraisal
of the properties so seized, said notice to be served in an authentic
manner, within ten (10) days following such seizure and such notice
shall be understood to have been served upon the mailing thereof with
return receipt requested. The owners, persons in charge, and other
persons having known interest in the property so seized may challenge
the confiscation within the fifteen (15) days following the service of the
notice on them, through a complaint against the officer under whose
authority the confiscation has been made, on whom notice shall be
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yacht. The owner of the yacht, who was not involved or aware
served, and which complaint shall be filed in the Part of the Superior
Court corresponding to the place where the seizure was made and shall
be heard without subjection to docket. All questions that may arise
shall be decided and all other proceedings shall be conducted as in an
ordinary civil action. Against the judgment entered no remedy shall lie
other than a certiorari before the Supreme Court, limited to issues of
law. The filing of such complaint within the period herein established
shall be considered a jurisdictional prerequisite for the availing of the
action herein authorized.
(b) Every vehicle, mount, or any vessel or plane so seized shall be ap-
praised as soon as taken possession of by the officer under whose au-
thority the seizure took place, or by his delegate, with the exception of
motor vehicles, which shall be placed under the custody of the Office
of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which shall
appraise same immediately upon receipt thereof.
In the event of a judicial challenge of the seizure, the court shall, upon
request of the plaintiff and after hearing the parties, determine the
reasonableness of the appraisal as an incident of the challenge.
Within ten (10) days after the filing of the challenge, the plaintiff shall
have the right to give bond in favor of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico before the pertinent court's clerk to the satisfaction of the court,
for the amount of the assessed value of the seized property, which
bond may be in legal tender, by certified check, hypothecary deben-
tures, or by insurance companies. Upon the acceptance of the bond,
the court shall direct the property be returned to the owner thereof. In
such case, the provisions of the following paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)
shall not apply.
When bond is accepted the subsequent substitution of the seized prop-
erty in lieu of the bond shall not be permitted, said bond to answer for
the seizure if the lawfulness of the latter is upheld, and the court shall
provide in the resolution issued to that effect, for the summary forfei-
ture execution of said bond by the clerk of the court and for the cover-
ing of such bond into the general funds of the Government of Puerto
Rico in case it may be in legal tender or by certified check; the hy-
pothecary debentures or debentures of insurance companies shall be
transmitted by the pertinent clerk of the court to the Secretary of Jus-
tice for execution.
(c) After fifteen (15) days have elapsed since service of notice of the
seizure without the person or persons with interest in the property
seized have [sic] filed the corresponding challenge, or after twenty-five
(25) days have elapsed since service of notice of the seizure without
the court's having directed that the seized property be returned on
account of the bond to that effect having been given, the officer under
whose authority the seizure took place, the delegate thereof, or the Of-
fice of Transportation, as the case may be, may provide for the sale at
auction of the seized property, or may set the same aside for official
use of the Government of Puerto Rico. In case the seized property can-
not be sold at auction or set aside for official use of the Government,
the property may be destroyed by the officer in charge, setting forth in
1982]
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of the wrongdoing,"' brought suit in federal court contending
that the forfeiture statute violated due process. A three-judge
panel relying principally on Fuentes held that the failure to
provide for pre-seizure notice and a hearing rendered the stat-
ute unconstitutional.""
The Supreme Court reversed.' Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, stated as follows:
The considerations that justified postponement of notice and
hearing in [the above cited contaminated food, bank failure,
misbranded drugs, collection of taxes, war effort, and state ju-
risdiction] cases are present here. First, seizure under the Pu-
erto Rican statutes serves significant governmental purposes:
Seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over
the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings thereby
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use
of the property and in enforcing criminal sanctions. Second,
preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests
served by the statutes, since the property seized-as here, a
yacht-will often be a sort that could be removed to another
jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of
confiscation were given. And finally, unlike the situation in
Fuentes, seizure is not initiated by self-interested private par-
a minute which he shall draw up for the purpose, the description of
the property, the reasons for its destruction and the date and place
where it is destroyed, and he shall serve notice with a copy thereof on
the Secretary of Justice.
(d) In case the vehicle, mount, or vessel or plane is sold at auction, the
proceeds from the sale shall be covered into the general fund of the
Government of Puerto Rico, after deducting and reimbursing expenses
incurred.
(e) If the seizure is judically challenged and the court declares same
illegal, the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico shall, upon pres-
entation of a certified copy of the final decision or judgment of the
court, pay to the challenger the amount of the appraisal or the pro-
ceeds from the public auction sale of such property, whichever sum is
the highest, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, count-
ing from the date of the seizure.
Subsections (b) and (c) were amended in 1975. "Office of Transportation" was
changed to "General Services Administration." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34 §§ 1722(b),
1722(c) (Equity Supp. 1980).
" 416 U.S. at 668.
119 Id. at 669.
120 Id.
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ties; rather, Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure
is appropriate under the provisions of the Puerto Rican stat-
utes. In these circumstances, we hold that this case presents an
"extraordinary" situation in which postponement of notice and
hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.12'
Due to the fact that section 903(b) is also a type of forfei-
ture statute,2 2 the statute should be analyzed in accordance
with the considerations articulated in Fuentes and applied in
Calero-Toledo. The first consideration in Fuentes, "govern-
mental or general public interest"'12 as it relates to the at-
tachment of an aircraft pursuant to section 903(b), arguably
could include the following: (1) in rem jurisdiction; (2) the
public safety; and (3) the assurance that the fine will be paid
if the government wins the collection case. The governmental
interest in attachment in order to procure in rem jurisdiction
does not seem compelling for two reasons. First, the Act al-
lows the government to proceed in personam against the per-
son subject to the penalty 24 as well as to proceed in rem
against the aircraft. Second, after the Supreme Court decided
Shaffer v. Heitner,125 a federal or state court's in rem jurisdic-
tion in a forfeiture proceeding cannot be more extensive than
its in personam jurisdiction. 2 ' Thus, the federal government's
" Id. at 679-80 (footnotes omitted).
1 See United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1979).
Forfeitures may be criminal or civil, in civil forfeitures the issue usually is whether
the property was used in an unlawful manner. The property owner's innocence is
normally not a defense. See generally Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property
Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925
(1980).
123 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
124 49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). FED. R. Civ. P. C(1)(b) (supplemental
rule for certain admiralty and maritime claims). Supplemental Rule C(1)(b) permits
actions in rem whenever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action
in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto. Id. Here, admiralty procedure is applicable
under 49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Its 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
126 Shaffer overruled Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), to the extent that it was
inconsistent with Shaffer, and held that because an adverse judgment in rem di-
rectly affects the property owner by divesting him of rights in property before the
court, the same fourteenth amendment due process "minimum contacts" standard of
fair play and substantial justice as was held to govern in personam actions in Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) governs all assertions of state court
jurisdicition, including in rem jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216-
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interest in in rem jurisdiction over the aircraft is slight in
light of the availability of in personam jurisdiction over the
owner of the aircraft. 127 The public safety issue, as was em-
17 (1977).
In federal court, the due process clause of the fifth amendment must be satisfied.
Recent decisions have required a "minimum contacts" analysis, analogous to that in
International Shoe except that the relevant contacts are those with the United
States. Thus, the person whose property rights are being affected must have sufficient
contacts with the United States before a federal court can constitutionally terminate
those rights. See, e.g., Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175,
1177-78 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980) (in personam jurisdiction
case); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332-34 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally
Comment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitation on Nationwide Federal Juris-
diction, 61 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1981).
Presumably, the commission of a violation of the FARs within the United States is
a sufficient contact to permit a federal court to take jurisdiction over the violator and
even over the owner of an aircraft involved in such a violation, when the owner was
somehow involved, or at least acquiesced, in the violation. One might question
whether the presence of an aircraft in the United States would be a sufficient contact
to allow a federal court to declare the aircraft forfeited when the owner was not in-
volved in the violation of a FAR and had no other significant contacts with the
United States. Compare Calero-Toledo v. Gleason Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) (Court seemed to be of the opinion that the presence of a ship in a country
was sufficient contact to allow a court in that country to declare the ship forfeited
except in cases in which the ship was stolen, on the "Deodand" theory that property
used in wrongdoing is itself "guilty") with World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 298 (1980) ("It is foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles sold by
[defendants] may take them to Oklahoma. But the mere 'unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the re-
quirement of contact with the forum state' "). Perhaps the more interesting question,
but one which is beyond the scope of this article, is to what extent the "Deodand"
theory can survive Shaffer's recognition that all actions are really against persons.
Significantly, section 901(b) of the Federal Aviation Act creates a lien against the
aircraft even when the non-owner pilot in command has committed a violation.
It should be emphasized that Calero-Toledo relied on Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921), for the proposition that attachment to establish in rem jurisdiction serves a
significant governmental purpose. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 679 n.13.
Fuentes also cited Ownbey for the proposition that foreign attachments are an excep-
tion to the pre-seizure hearing requirement. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23. In Shaffer,
however, the Supreme Court stated:
The only question before the Court in Ownbey, was the constitutional-
ity of a requirement that a defendant whose property has been at-
tached file a bond before entering appearance. We do not read the re-
cent references to Ownbey as necessarily suggesting that Ownbey is
consistent with more recent decisions interpreting the Due Process
Clause.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 194 n.10. See also Jonnet v. Dollar Saving Bank of
N.Y., 530 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The rationale of Ownbey is no longer in
harmony with the principles of Fuentes and its progeny.").
127 A situation could occur when the fifth amendment would permit a federal dis-
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phasized by the court of appeals in United States v. Vertol
H21C, 128 is not persuasive because upon the posting of a bond
the aircraft can be returned to use.12e Finally, the governmen-
tal interest in assuring that a fine will be paid if the govern-
ment wins the collection case is, of course, the same interest
any creditor has in prejudgment attachment or in garnish-
ment and is not in any principled way different from the
plaintiffs' interests in Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and Di-
Chem. 30
As to the second consideration articulated in Fuentes and
Calero-Toledo, that a special need for prompt action exists, it
is certainly true that an aircraft, like a yacht, can be moved,
destroyed, or concealed. Neither the Act nor the FARs, how-
ever, require a showing of the necessity for prompt action
prior to notice of seizure. While one might conclude that
prompt action is always necessary in an action to declare a
vessel forfeited for being used in an unlawful purpose, the
same can hardly be said of the majority of section 903(b)
trict court to take in personam jurisdiction over an owner but no statute or rule
would provide for service of process. For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) permits service
under the long-arm statute of the state upon a party not an inhabitant or found
within the state in which the federal district court is held. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) per-
mits, in addition, service outside the state but in the United States not more than 100
miles from the district court. Admiralty procedure applies in cases under section
903(b)(1), see supra note 124, but Admiralty Rule A provides that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are also applicable in such cases. No federal statute authorizes
nation-wide service of process in cases under section 903(b). Thus, it is possible that a
federal district court sitting in a state which did not have a broad long-arm statute
could get in rem jurisdiction under Admiralty Rule C but could not obtain in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a person who is not an inhabitant of the state or who can be
found within the state but not more than 100 miles from the court. Admiralty Rule C,
however, does not require pre-arrest notice or an opportunity for a hearing. A split of
authority exists as to whether Rule C is therefore unconstitutional. See Amstar Corp.
v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 908 n.10 (4th Cir. 1981) (listing cases). Amstar
held Rule C constitutional as applied because Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) is applicable in
admiralty and provides for a pre-trial determination of a challenge to the court's in
rem jurisdiction. The court failed to note that nothing requires a prompt hearing on a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motion. Moreover, in regard to a section 903(b) seizure, no guar-
antee exists that the judicial proceeding will be promptly initiated.
"Is See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
SO In United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
opined that the sole justification of the seizure was to facilitate the collection of the
penalty sought by the FAA.
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cases. In most section 903(b) cases, a maximum penalty of
$1,000 can be imposed for the violation of a FAR.1"1 There-
fore, it is unlikely that an owner or an operator will secret
away an aircraft to avoid a fine as small as $1,000.
Finally, the FAA does not meet the third consideration in
Fuentes. The FAA does not have strict control over the proce-
dure of seizing aircraft. The FAA scheme, like the Puerto Ri-
can forfeiture statute in Calero-Toledo, allows a governmental
official to initiate the seizure.13 2 The official, however, is
hardly required to determine "under standards of a narrowly
drawn statute, that [the seizure] was necessary and justified in
the particular instance.'Iss
Section 903(b) can be distinguished from the Puerto Rican
forfeiture statute that was upheld in Calero-Toledo on the ba-
sis that the three considerations stated in Fuentes, that "the
seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest,""1 4 "that there has
been a special need for prompt action,"' ' and that "the State
has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate
forces," ' are not compelling as they relate to section 903(b).
Therefore, section 903(b) would seem to be unconstitutional
for failure to provide the opportunity for a hearing prior to
the seizure of an aircraft. Moreover, the lack of any provision
in the Act or the FARs for a post-seizure hearing would cer-
tainly seem to render the procedure of the FARs unconstitu-
11. In Calero-Toledo, for example, the lessor of a yacht forfeited the yacht because
the lessee left a marijuana cigarette on it. Faced with such a harsh judgment, the
owner of a ship or an aircraft might well be tempted to secret it away. The same can
hardly be said when the owner-pilot of an expensive aircraft is faced only with a
relatively small fine for having flown too low, the most common violation of the FARs
in calendar year 1979. "Enforcement Activity General Aviation," Annual Statistical
Summary Paper, U.S. Dept. of Trans., F.A.A. 9 (1979).
It 49 U.S.C. § 1473(b)(2) (1976).
"33 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). Ironically, if no government official
was involved, the due process clause would not come into play. See Flagg Bros., Inc.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that N.Y. CoM. LAW § 7-210 (McKinney 1964)
authorizing a warehouseman to seize stored goods and sell them for nonpayment of
fees, does not involve state action).




tional. In Mitchell and Calero-Toledo the statutory schemes
that the Supreme Court upheld provided for prompt post-
seizure hearings. Even assuming that Mitchell and not Fuen-
tes controls after Di-Chem on the question of whether a post-
seizure hearing as opposed to a pre-seizure hearing is re-
quired, it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would
approve of a scheme which provided neither a pre-seizure
hearing nor a prompt post-seizure hearing. Significantly, in
Mitchell, the Supreme Court based its decision upholding the
Louisiana sequestration procedure on two grounds. First, the
statute required a pre-seizure judicial determination, albeit in
an ex parte proceeding, that the creditor had demonstrated a
right in the property and the necessity of seizing the property
without prior notice. Second, the debtor was afforded an im-
mediate post-seizure hearing in which the burden was on the
creditor to prove his right to possess the property pending the
outcome of the case. 137
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on
the question of the need for a prompt post-seizure hearing in
forfeiture cases," 8 the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews
v. Eldridge,39 provides a framework for assessing the consti-
tutional sufficiency of the governmental procedure used to
seize and to retain property pending final adjudication. Ma-
thews held that the due process clause did not require an op-
portunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination
of social security disability benefits pending final adjudication
of the case. 40 The Supreme Court indicated, however, that
due process does require that the procedure used to terminate
benefits contain safeguards against erroneous deprivation. 4 1
M' See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
"" The Supreme Court recently declined an invitation to do so. United States v.
Miller, No. 77-1523 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (delay of
38 months from seizure to institution of judicial proceedings) (summarized in 46 U.S.
L.W. 3725 (May 23, 1978); 47 U.S.L.W. 3047 (Aug. 8, 1978)). See generally Kandaras,
Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate
Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 S.w. L.J. 925 (1980).
.3' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
140 Id. at 349.
. Id. at 334-35.
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While no single procedure is constitutionally mandated,1"2
three factors should be considered under the Mathews analy-
sis: (1) the private interests involved; (2) the risk of an errone-
ous seizure in light of the probable value of a post-seizure
hearing; and (3) the government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and the administrative burdens
that alternative proceedings would entail.14 3
When these three factors are applied to the seizure of air-
craft, it becomes obvious that pre-seizure or post-seizure hear-
ings should be available under section 903(b). When an air-
craft is seized, the private interests of the owner are
significantly affected. An owner's interest may be influenced
by the setting of a high bond, by the length of a pretrial delay,
or by the fact that the aircraft is used in the owner's busi-
ness.1" The Supreme Court has required pretrial hearings
when a person's private interests have been affected by the
deprivation of a horse trainer's license, 45 utility service, 4 a
high school education' 47  government employment, 48  a
driver's license, 4 9 or welfare benefits. 5 ' If these types of
property deprivations require a pretrial hearing, then the
seizure of an aircraft even if used purely for pleasure at least
should be classified as "important.' 151
The second factor of the Mathews analysis, risk of errone-
ous deprivation, could occur if an aircraft is seized pursuant
to section 903(b). Section 903(b) only seems to require an ex
parte determination by the FAA that the aircraft seized was
4, Id. at 334.
Id. at 335. The Supreme Court has applied the rationale of Mathews in a num-
ber of subsequent cases. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 4406 (U.S. Apr.
20, 1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 677 (1980). See generally Note, Ma-
thews v. Eldridge Reviewed: A Fair Test on Balance, 67 GEo. L.J. 1407 (1979).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1976). Cf. United
States v. Miller, No. 77-1523 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)
(delay of 38 months).
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
141 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
140 See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
"4, See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
15o See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'" See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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involved in violating a FAR for which the issuance of a civil
penalty letter is contemplated. 5 ' The FAA takes the position
that the notice of seizure can serve to inform the owner of the
violations and the liabilities involved.1 53
Obviously, the risk of error is heightened when the aircraft
is seized without the owner having an opportunity to provide
information. 154 In similar situations, the Supreme Court has
required the imposition of an impartial decisionmaker to de-
termine whether a person may be deprived of his property
while a final adjudication is pending.' 55 When no pre-seizure
hearing is required, a prompt post-seizure hearing before an
impartial decisionmaker, as Mitchell illustrates, may alleviate
the harm resulting from an initial error by reducing the period
of wrongful deprivation.' 56
The third factor considered in Mathews, the fiscal and the
administrative burden caused by affording a hearing, seems to
weigh in favor of requiring a hearing before a section 903(b)
seizure. Considering the significance of the private interest in-
volved, the administrative and the fiscal burdens of a hearing
would be negligible.' 57 The seizure order already provides no-
tice to the owner of the aircraft who allegedly violated the Act
or FARs.' 58 A prompt post-seizure hearing before an impartial
and independent government officer where the owner could be
represented by counsel and could present evidence on his own
behalf, and where the government would have the burden of
showing probable cause' 59 that the aircraft be subject to a
See supra note 50.
163 See supra note 14.
' See supra note 50.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 443
U.S. 1 (1979) (risk of erroneous deprivation minimized where driver's license sus-
pended without pre-suspension hearing for failure to take a breathalizer test when
arresting officer would invariably witness the driver's refusal).
'" See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
'57 In United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648, 651 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
noted that the government had not contended that a pre-seizure hearing would un-
duly hamper FAA enforcement efforts.
168 14 C.F.R. § 13.17(c) (1982).
89 The fourth amendment prohibits the government from seizing property without
probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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lien, does not seem unduly burdensome. 00
III. CONCLUSION
No pre-seizure or prompt post-seizure hearing is required
by the Act or by the FARs when an aircraft is seized pursuant
to section 903(b). Whether the Supreme Court's decisions in
Sniadach, Fuentes and Di-Chem require a pre-seizure hearing
when read in the light of Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court's
decisions in Mitchell and Mathews would clearly seem to re-
quire a prompt post-seizure hearing. The failure to provide a
prompt post-seizure hearing enables the FAA to hold an air-
craft pending the outcome of a trial in federal district court.
As a result, the FAA may be able to hold the aircraft for a
long time.'61 The owner would not be able to regain possession
of his aircraft unless the owner paid a (generally) high
bond,'62 paid the fine assessed by the FAA, or compromised
his position.163 This procedure could cause an imbalance in
negotiating positions which could prompt the aircraft owner
to accept a settlement, simply to obtain the release of his air-
craft.""' Section 903(b) of the Act and section 13.17 of the
"'0 See 14 C.F.R. § 13.16 (1982) (detailing the notice and hearing requirements
which apply in cases in which the FAA contemplates assessing civil penalties for vio-
lations of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act § 110, 49 U.S.C. § 1809 (1976).
IS, See, e.g., United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1976) (appar-
ently 19 months from seizure to release of aircraft on board). Cf. United States v.
Miller, No. 77-1523 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (38
months from seizure to instigation of forfeiture proceedings). The Court has recog-
nized the possible length of wrongful deprivation as an important consideration.
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975); Armstrbng v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551
(1965).
... Although the civil penalties here under consideration are limited to $1,000 per
violation, more than one violation may be alleged and the violation may be consid-
ered continuing. Thus, in United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir.
1976), bond was set at $6,000, and in United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656
F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1979), the bond was $25,000.
1 See supra note 15.
10, In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969), the Supreme Court
based its decision in part on the consideration that just such an imbalance in negoti-
ating positions would make it likely that the debtor would accept an unfair settle-
ment and abandon a good defense on the merits.
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FARs thus work to deprive the owner of property without due
process and are facially unconstitutional. "
,s5 Significantly, few cases have been decided on the basis of section 903(b)
seizures. See Letter from Richard C. Hall, Chief of Nat'l Safety Data Branch of FAA
Flight Standards Nat'l Field Office, to Edward B. Arnolds, (Mar. 31, 1982) (the letter
stated that no aircraft had been seized pursuant to section 13.17 of the FARs between
July 1, 1980 and the date of the letter).
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